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FOURTH AMENDMENT-WORKRELATED SEARCHES BY
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYERS VALID
ON "REASONABLE" GROUNDS
O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In O'Connor v. Ortega,' a plurality of the United States Supreme
Court continued an expansion of the "few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions ' 2 to the fourth amendment requirement that an unconsented search be supported by a warrant based
upon probable cause. In O'Connor, the Court affirmed the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision 3 that a state
government employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
desk and file cabinets at his place of work. 4 However, the Court
reversed the lower court's summary judgment that the government
employer's extensive unconsented search of the employee's office,
desk, and file cabinets violated his fourth amendment rights. 5 In
arriving at an appropriate standard to review the search of a government employee's work area, a plurality of the Court attempted to
balance the intrusions on the privacy interests of the individual
against the government's need to conduct its business in an efficient
and proper manner, 6 holding that "public employer intrusions on
the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for
investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the
standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances." 7 The plurality noted further that the search must be reasonable both at its
inception and in its scope.8 This Note reviews the O'Connoropinions
and concludes that the holding that a government employee has a
1 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987)(plurality opinion).
2 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
3 O'Connor v. Ortega, 764 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1985).

107 S. Ct. at 1499 (plurality opinion).
5 Id. at 1504 (plurality opinion).
6 Id. at 1499 (plurality opinion).
7 Id. at 1502 (plurality opinion).
8 Id. at 1502-03 (plurality opinion).
4
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legitimate expectation of privacy in his desk and file cabinets is consistent with the basic principles of the fourth amendment. However,
this Note suggests that the plurality's announced departure from the
warrant and probable cause protections of the fourth amendment is
an unnecessary and ominous limitation of individual liberty' from
unconsented searches. The predictable results of the announced
reasonableness standard are confusion over what "reasonable under
all the circumstances" actually limits and a corresponding increase
in arbitrary intrusions into the legitimate privacy interests of government employees.
II.

FACTS

On July 30, 1981, Dr. Magno Ortega, a physician and a psychiatrist for seventeen years at Napa State Hospital, was requested by
Dr. Dennis O'Connor, 9 the hospital's Executive Director, to take a
paid administrative leave of his position as Chief of Professional Education.1 0 The justification for the request was to facilitate the investigation of Dr. Ortega regarding possible work-related
misconduct concerning the acquisition of a personal computer, 1 alleged incidents of sexual harassment of two female hospital employees, and inappropriate disciplinary action taken against one of the
12
hospital's residents.
The four member investigative team selected by Dr. O'Connor
was comprised of hospital personnel, including the hospital administrator, Richard Friday, and an internal hospital security guard.' 3
Mr. Friday initiated the search of Dr. Ortega's office at a unidentified point in time during the investigation, the purpose of which was
disputed by the parties. 14 Dr. Ortega asserted the search was under9 Id. at 1495 (plurality opinion). Dr. O'Connor was supported in his request by
other hospital officials. Id. (plurality opinion).
10 Id. at 1496 (plurality opinion). Dr. Ortega, as Chief of Professional Education at
the hospital, had primary responsibility for the training and education of physicians in
psychiatric residency programs. Id. at 1495 (plurality opinion).
"1 Id. (plurality opinion). There was speculation by hospital officials that Dr. Ortega
had mislead Dr. O'Connor that the computer had been donated to him and that the
residents had been coerced into actually paying for it. Id. (plurality opinion).
12 Id. (plurality opinion). Dr. Ortega requested and was permitted to take two weeks
paid vacation in lieu of the admistrative leave. However, when the two-week period
ended on August 14, 1981, Dr. Ortega was informed by Dr. O'Connor that the investigation was not yet complete and that Dr. Ortega was being placed on paid administrative
leave. During the time period up to September 22, 1981, when Dr. Ortega's employment was terminated, Dr. Ortega was requested not to enter the hospital grounds. Id.
(plurality opinion).
'3 Id. at 1496. (plurality opinion).
14 Id. (plurality opinion).
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taken to secure evidence to be used against him in administrative
disciplinary hearings. 15 The hospital initially claimed the search to
be a routine inventory of state property in the office of a terminated
employee. 16 However, Dr. Ortega's employment had not been terminated when the search was undertaken, and the hospital had no
policy of inventorying state property of employees who are on ad17
ministrative leave.
The repeated searches of Dr. Ortega's office of seventeen years
were extensive.' 8 The investigators seized several personal items
from Dr. Ortega's files and desk, including a photograph, a book of
poetry, and a Valentine's Day card, all of which had been given to
Dr. Ortega by a former resident physician.' 9 Also seized were the
billing files of one of Dr. Ortega's private patients under the California Medicaid program. 20 There was no formal inventory undertaken of state property in Dr. Ortega's office. 2 1 Rather, the contents
of the office, with the exception of the personal items seized, were
boxed up and put into storage for Dr. Ortega's subsequent
22
retrieval.
Dr. Ortega brought an action in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California against the hospital
and Dr. O'Connor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,23 alleging that the
search of his office and the seizure of his personal items violated his
fourth amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search and
seizure. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
granted judgment for the petitioners. 24 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part,
granting summary judgment for Dr. Ortega regarding the liability
15 Id. (plurality opinion).
16 Id. (plurality opinion). The computer that was the object of part of the investiga-

tion was also believed to have been taken home by Dr. Ortega. Id. (plurality opinion).
17 Id. The hospital subsequently modified their previously stated purpose to a need
to secure state property. Id. (plurality opinion).
18 Id. (plurality opinion).
19 Id. (plurality opinion). The personal items seized were subsequently used to impeach the credibility of the former resident who had come forward to testify on Dr.
Ortega's behalf at his termination proceeding. Id. (plurality opinion).
20 Id. (plurality opinion).
21 Id. (plurality opinion). One of the investigators claimed the task would have been
too difficult given the amount of papers in the office. Id. (plurality opinion).
22 Id.

(plurality opinion).

23 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).

24 Id. (plurality opinion). The district court relied upon Chenkin v. Bellevue Hosp.
Center, New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 479 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), concluding there was a legitimate need to secure state property. O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at
1496 (plurality opinion).
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for an unlawful search. 2 5 The court of appeals concluded that Dr.
Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and remanded the case for a determination of damages. 2 6 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider, first, whether
the respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his work
area and, second, the appropriate fourth amendment standard to
use in determining the reasonableness of a government employer
search of an area in which a government employee does have a rea27
sonable expectation of privacy.
III.
A.

SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

PLURALITY OPINION

In O'Connor v. Ortega,28 a divided United States Supreme Court
reversed the appellate court's grant of summary judgment holding
that the facts must be further analyzed under a standard of "reasonableness" to determine whether any violation of Dr. Ortega's fourth
amendment rights had occurred. 29 Justice O'Connor delivered the
plurality's opinion. 30 She emphasized that although a public employee may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his desk and
file cabinets, 3 ' " '[w]hat is reasonable depends on the context within
which a search takes place.' ",32 Justice O'Connor stated that determining the standard of reasonableness with which to judge a government search of an employee's work area requires a balancing of
the government's objectives alleged to justify the search against the
intrusiveness of the search upon the individual's fourth amendment
33
rights.
Justice O'Connor began her analysis by examining the privacy
rights of government employees in the workplace. 3 4 She stated that
Ortega, 764 F. 2d 703 (9th Cir. 1985).
26 O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. at 1496 (plurality opinion).
27 Id. at 1495 (plurality opinion).
28 107 S. Ct. 1492 (plurality opinion).
29 Id. at 1504 (plurality opinion).
30 Justice O'Connor was joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist,Justice White, andJustice
Powell.
31 Id. at 1499 (plurality opinion).
32 Id. (plurality opinion)(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985)).
33 Id. (plurality opinion).
34 Id. at 1497 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor noted that state government employees receive fourth amendment rights through the fourteenth amendment and that,
in past decisions, the fourth amendment has been held applicable to the actions of numerous government actors. See New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. at 334-35 (school officials); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)(building inspectors);
Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978)(Occupational Safety and Health
Act inspectors). O'Connor, 107 S.Ct. at 1497 (plurality opinion).
25 O'Connor v.

796

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[Vol. 78

an individual's privacy and personal security interests suffer regardless of whether the search is in connection with an investigation of a
criminal violation or a statutory or regulatory violation. 35 She further added that "it would be 'anomolous to say that the individual
and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.' "36 Justice O'Connor concluded, therefore, that the fourth
amendment restrictions were applicable to government employers
or supervisors who desired to search their employee's private
37
property.
Having determined the applicability of the fourth amendment
to the private property of government employees, Justice O'Connor
asserted that the standard for determining whether Dr. Ortega's
fourth amendment rights have been infringed is whether the search
of his office " 'infringed an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable.' "38 Although she admitted that there
was no explicit criteria to determine society's expectations of privacy, Justice O'Connor noted that prior cases had involved factors
such as the intention of the framers of the fourth amendment, the
39
individual's use of the land, and the general mores of society.
Justice O'Connor attempted to delineate the different privacy
interests at force in the workplace context. She stated that both the
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy and the applicable standard with which to assess the reasonableness of a search can change
according to the context of a situation.40 Therefore, Justice
O'Connor stated, workplace context must be clearly defined. She
reasoned that certain areas of the workplace such as the "hallways,
cafeteria, offices, desks, and file cabinets, among other areas, are all
part of the workplace." 4 1 Moreover, Justice O'Connor emphasized,
these areas did not become personal areas through the actions of an
42
employee.
Justice O'Connor acknowledged that prior decisions of the
Id. (plurality opinion) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 335).
Id. (plurality opinion)(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 335).
37 Id. (plurality opinion).
38 Id. (plurality opinion)(quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113
(1984)).
39 Id. (plurality opinion)(citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)).
40 Id. (plurality opinion).
41 Id. (plurality opinion).
42 Id. (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor mentioned, for example, an employee's
placing of a photogragh in a desk or the posting of a letter on an employee bulletin
board as incidents that would not diminish the workplace context of those areas. Id.
(plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor added, however, that some items, such as luggage,
a briefcase, or a handbag, that are brought into the workplace are not part of the work35
36
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Court in Mancusi v. DeForte4 3 and Oliver v. United States44 have recognized the reasonable expectations of privacy an employee may have
regarding warrantless searches of his office by the police. 4 5 Justice
O'Connor stated that "[a]s with the expectation of privacy in one's
home, such an expectation in one's place of work is 'based upon
societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the
[Fourth] Amendment.' "46 She noted that in Mancusi the Court held
that a union employee in a shared union office "would have been
entitled to expect that he would not be disturbed except by personal
or business invitees, and that records would not be taken except
'4 7
with his permission or that of his union superiors.
Citing Mancusi and Oliver, Justice O'Connor rejected the contention of the Solicitor General and petitioners that a government
employee can never have a valid expectation of privacy in a workplace setting. 48 She asserted that fourth amendment rights are not
lost simply because one is employed by the government. 49 Justice
O'Connor cautioned that "[tihe operational realities of the workplace, however, may make some employees' expectations of privacy
unreasonable when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than a law
enforcement official." 50 Justice O'Connor noted that legitimate regulations or general office practices can diminish reasonable expectations of privacy in offices of both the government as well as the
private sector. 5 1 The plurality opinion further suggested that the
activities in a typical government office will include many intrusions
of a private office by co-workers, superiors, consensual visitors, and
the general public.5 2 In effect, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the
place context; therefore, the standard used for a workplace search would not necessarily
apply. Id. (plurality opinion).
43 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
44 466 U.S. 170 (1984)(the Court in Oliver, which held that "open fields" did not
come under the protection of the fourth amendment, discussed the fourth amendment
protection of homes and offices as examples of areas of individual privacy that society
has recognized as reasonable.
45 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1498 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor noted that Mancsi clearly extended an expectation of privacy to an individual in his office at a union's

headquarters. Id. (plurality opinion).
46 Id. (plurality opinion)(quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 n.8
(1984)).
47 Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369).

48 Id. (plurality opinion).
49 Id. (plurality opinion).
50 Id. (plurality opinion)(emphasis in original).
51 Id. (plurality opinion).
52 Id. (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Scalia, who stated in
his concurrance that "[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the
government does not disappear merely because the government has the right to make
reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer." Id. (plurality opinion)(emphasis in
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employment relation or the nature of the office can waive any reasonable expectation of privacy in a workplace. 5 3 Because of the possibility of an employee having no reasonable expectation of privacy
and the wide range of work environments that exist in the public
sector, Justice O'Connor concluded that whether a public employee
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his workplace is a decision
'54
to be made on a "case-by-case basis."
Justice O'Connor next considered the evidence that Dr. Ortega
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his private office.5 5 In
reviewing the lower court's record, Justice O'Connor revealed that
Dr. Ortega occupied his private office for seventeen years and that
he kept personal files, personal correspondence, personal financial
records, teaching aids and notes, medical files and correspondence
from private patients not connected to the hospital, and personal
gifts and momentos there. 56 Justice O'Connor noted that the hospital files on residence training were kept outside the office 57 and also
that nothing besides personal items were seized. 58 She further commented that the absence of a hospital policy discouraging employees from keeping personal items in their desks or file cabinets
supported the validity of Dr. O'Connor's assertion of privacy.5 9 Justice O'Connor concluded that the court of appeals' holding that Dr.
Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy "at least in his desk
60
and file cabinets" was correct.
Justice O'Connor rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis that concluded that Dr. Ortega's fourth amendment rights had been violated
merely because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
office. 6 1 She stressed that finding that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his government office is only the start of
the analysis of whether there was a violation of his fourth amendoriginal). However, she went on to state that, as a result of an office's accessibility to
other employees or the public, there can be situations in which no expectation of privacy
would be considered reasonable. Id. (plurality opinion).
53 Id. (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor cited Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351 (1967), in which the Court stated that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1498 (plurality opinion).
54 107 S. Ct. at 1498 (plurality opinion).
55 Id. (plurality opinion).
56 Id. at 1499 (plurality opinion).
57 Id. (plurality opinion).
58 Id. (plurality opinion).
59 Id. (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor was careful to stress that the lack of a
policy against keeping personal items in a work area does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy if one does not already exist. Id. (plurality opinion).
60 Id. (plurality opinion).
61 Id. (plurality opinion).
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ment rights. 6 2 Justice O'Connor asserted that the reasonableness of
a search depends upon the context in which it is undertaken. 63 According to Justice O'Connor, arriving at an appropriate standard
with which to analyze a particular class of searches "requires
'balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.' "64 The applicable interests at stake for the employer in a search of an employee's office, the plurality added, are the desire for a productive,
efficient office and the related needs of supervision and control. 65
Against the interests of the employer, Justice O'Connor continued,
the legitimate privacy interests of the employee must be balanced. 66
Justice O'Connor acknowledged that, except in a small class of
exceptional circumstances, a valid search warrant is the requirement
for an unconsented search of an individual's private property. 67 She
noted that the narrow circumstances that have justified dispensing
with the traditional warrant requirement are those in which obtaining a warrant has been "likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search."' 68 As an example of such a situation,
Justice O'Connor noted that the Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 6 9 held
that a warrant was not required in a school environment because it
would "unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and infor70
mal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools."
Justice O'Connor then reviewed the limited case law dealing
with work-related searches by public employers. 7 ' She concluded
that the lower court decisions could be summarized as standing generally for the proposition that "any 'work related' search by an emId. (plurality opinion).
Id. (plurality opinion)(citing NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985)).
Id. (plurality opinion)(quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
65 Id. (plurality opinion).
66 Id. (plurality opinion).
67 Id. (plurality opinion)(citing Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. at 370; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 528-29).
68 Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 533). Justice O'Connor cited Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), in support of her
proposition that a warrant can be disposed of when it imposes severe burdens.
O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1500 (plurality opinion). In M~arshall, the Court held a warrant
requirement valid only after "concluding that warrants would not 'impose serious burdens on the inspection system or the courts, [would not] prevent inspections necessary
to enforce the statute, or [would not] make them less effective.' " O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at
1500 (plurality opinion) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 316).
69 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
70 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1500 (plurality opinion).
71 Id. (plurality opinion).
62
63
64
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ployer satisfies
the Fourth
Amendment
reasonableness
requirement.- 7 2 In addition, she noted that some lower courts have
suggested foregoing a "probable cause" standard in favor of a lesser
73
standard.
Justice O'Connor then argued that although public employees
can have substantial privacy interests in "private objects" they bring
to the workplace, the "realities of the workplace.., strongly suggest
that a warrant requirement would be unworkable." 74 In support of
this proposition, Justice O'Connor stressed the differences she perceived between a search for evidence to be used in a law enforcement proceeding and the routine needs of co-workers and superiors
in a workplace to enter an office for reasons unrelated to criminal
misconduct. 75 She reasoned that the government agency's legitimate desire to achieve efficiency can create a pressing need to ob76
tain a file or correspondence from an absent co-worker's office.
By analogy, Justice O'Connor inferred that the facts of the instant
case could be viewed as arising from a "need to safeguard or identify state property or records in an office in connection with a pend' 77
ing investigation into suspected employee malfeasance.
Justice O'Connor concluded that a warrant requirement for a
work-related search would be "unduly burdensome" and would "seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business. ' 78 Furthermore,
she asserted that the warrant procedures are "unwieldly" and would
be unreasonable requirements for a supervisor to become familiar
with. 79 Justice O'Connor emphasized that the concern that expansion of constitutional issues that can be challenged in government
72 Id. (plurality opinion). See United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 111I, 1123 (7th Cir.
1973)(holding that searches and seizures by public employers are reasonable under the
fourth amendment if they are "work related"); United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d 863,
868 (2nd Cir. 1965)(concluding that a search and seizure was valid because it was conducted pursuant to "the power of the Government as defendant's employer, to supervise and investigate the performance of his duties as a Customs employee").
73 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1500 (plurality opinion). See United States v. Bunkers, 521
F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1975)(utilized a "reasonable cause" standard); United States v. Blok,
188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951)(suggesting that a search for official property required
for official use would be an exception to the warrant requirement). Justice O'Connor
further noted that the lower court cases that have implied that a warrant was required

have been for a search that concerned criminal misconduct, United States v. Kahan, 350
F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), and a search that was not work related, Gillard v. Schmidt,
579 F.2d 825, 829 (3rd Cir. 1978).
74 O'Connor, 107 S.Ct. at 1500 (plurality opinion).
75 Id. (plurality opinion).
76 Id. (plurality opinion).
77 Id. (plurality opinion).
78 Id. (plurality opinion).
79 Id. (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor continued that supervisors are distinguishable from other parties who have been required to satisfy the warrant requirement
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offices could threaten the office's proper function.8 0
Justice O'Connor, having dispensed with a warrant requirement
for a work-related search, next analyzed whether the standard of
"probable cause" alone would be too burdensome for government
employers to meet. 8 1 Conceding that probable cause is not as clear
an issue as the warrant reqirement, she noted, however, that
"[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and private interests
suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause,
we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard." 8 2 Justice
O'Connor added that for administrative searches an administrative
warrant issued on the basis of a reasonable legislative or administrative standard, rather than a finding of probable cause, has been held
valid by the Court.8 3 Further, the plurality noted that there are a
multitude of contexts that can arise in which a public employer will
have a desire to intrude upon the privacy of an employee.8 4 She
stressed that the fourth amendment standard of reasonableness to
be determined is limited "only" for the employer intrusions
outlined. 5
Justice O'Connor then reiterated the strong government interest in the operation of an efficient workplace.8 6 She emphasized
that the "work of these [government] agencies would suffer if employers were required to have probable cause before they entered
an employee's desk for the purpose of finding a file or a piece of
office correspondence. ' 8 7 Furthermore, she contended that given
that traditional probable cause analysis has developed in the criminal investigatory context, there is little logic to support the use of
88
probable cause in a noninvestigatory work-related situation.
Therefore, Justice O'Connor reasoned, "public employers must be
given wide latitude to enter employee offices for work related,
in that the supervisors are not in the business of investigating violations of criminal law.
Id. at 1501 (plurality opinion).
80 Id. (plurality opinion)(citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)).
81 Id. (plurality opinion).
82 Id. (plurality opinion)(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)).
83 Id. (plurality opinion). See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
84 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1501 (plurality opinion).
85 Id. (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor described the facts of the case at bar as
concerning either a work-related investigatory search for evidence of employee malfeasance or a work-related noninvestigatory intrusion. Id. (plurality opinion).
86 Id. (plurality opinion).
87 Id. (plurality opinion).
88 Id. (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor also stressed that probable cause lacks
meaning in a routine inventory of state property. Id. (plurality opinion).
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noninvestigatory reasons. '"89
According to the plurality, requiring a standard of probable
cause for a search to investigate a public employee's misfeasance
would not only impose "intolerable burdens on public employers,"
but also would result in "tangible and often irreparable damage to
the agency's work, and ultimately to the public interest." 90 Supporting this position, Justice O'Connor reasserted the importance of the
proper operation and efficiency of government agencies both to the
agencies as well as to the public interest. 9 1 She further emphasized
the distinctions between the interests involved in a criminal investigation and those present in an investigation of work-related misfeasance. 92 Whereas enforcing criminal law is in the interest of law
enforcement agents, Justice O'Connor believed that "ensuring that
the work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient man93
ner" is the overriding concern of the government agent.
In addition, Justice O'Connor stated that, as with school teachers, supervisors in most government agencies possess neither the
training nor the experience to make informed, quick judgments as
to whether a probable cause standard is satisfied. 94 She stressed
that while law enforcement officers are expected to learn the intricacies of the standard, it would be unrealistic to require the same
training of government employers and supervisors. 9 5 The plurality
therefore stated that a "reasonableness" standard would be more
appropriate because it would allow proper "regulation of the employee's conduct 'according to the dictates of reason and common
sense.' "96
Justice O'Connor again alluded to the employee's privacy interests, but asserted that they are far less compelling than the privacy
interests that can be found in the home. 9 7 She stated further that
the intrusions at issue are "relatively limited invasion[s]" of an employee's privacy. 9 8 Moreover, Justice O'Connor reasoned, the sole
Id. (plurality opinion).
90 Id. at 1502. (plurality opinion).
91 Id. (plurality opinion).
92 Id. at 1501 (plurality opinion)(citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351
(1985)(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)).
93 Id. at 1502 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor noted the reasoning from New
Jersey v. T.L.O. that the time taken to develop probable cause was time taken away from
the essential task of education. Id. (plurality opinion). See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
94 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1502 (plurality opinion).
95 Id. (plurality opinion).
96 Id. (plurality opinion)(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343).
97 Id. (plurality opinion).
98 Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 537).
89
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purpose of providing employee offices is to give the employees a
place to do their work. 9 9 If employees wanted to keep anything private, the plurality continued, they could simply leave their personal
items at home.1 00
Justice O'Connor stressed that government employers possess
"special needs" beyond those of normal law enforcement to make
intrusions on employee privacy for work-related noninvestigatory
reasons or for investigations of employee misfeasance. 1 0o As a result, she concluded, the probable cause standard is impracticable. 10 2
In addition, Justice O'Connor stated a standard of reasonableness
will neither unduly burden a government agency's efforts to run effi03
ciently, nor allow arbitrary intrusions of an employee's privacy.'
Therefore, Justice O'Connor announced, the appropriate standard
for government intrusions of a public employee's fourth amendment right to privacy in the workplace for work-related noninvestigation purposes and for investigations of employee misfeasance is
"reasonableness under all the circumstances."' 10 4
Justice O'Connor added that the standard of reasonableness
must be satisfied with regards both to the inception of the search
and to the scope of the intrusion. Specifically, the plurality stated
that "[d]etermining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider 'whether the . . .action was
justified at its inception,'10 5 ; second, one must determine whether
the search as actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.' "106 Justice O'Connor further added that a government employer's investigatory search to prove employee misfeasance or an
intrusion for a noninvestigatory work-related reason would bejustified at their inception provided that reasonable grounds exist to
suggest that the intrusions will achieve the desired objectives. According to Justice O'Connor, the scope of the search will be justified
99 Id. (plurality opinion).
100 Id. (plurality opinion).
101 Id. (plurality opinion).
102 Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun,

J., concurring in judgment)).
103 Id. (plurality opinion).
104

Id. (plurality opinion).

105 Id. at 1503 (plurality opinion)(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1967); and

NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341). Id. (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor noted
that the standard of reasonableness announced does not address whether an "individualized suspicion" is a necessary element because the individualized suspicion was present for Dr. Ortega. Id. (plurality opinion). See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342,
n.8.
106 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1503. (plurality opinion)
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when the "measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and are not excessively intrusive in light of... the
' 10 7
nature of the [misconduct]."
The plurality next addressed whether the search of Dr. Ortega's
office met the standard of reasonableness that had been set forth.
Justice O'Connor noted that because no evidentiary hearings had
been held, 10 8 the record was insufficient to determine the reasonableness of the search.' 0 9 Justice O'Connor asserted that an evidentiary hearing was necessary as the parties had, and continued to
have, a material dispute over the initial justification for the search of
Dr. Ortega's office." 0
Justice O'Connor stated that the petitioners had continuously
maintained that the intrusion was necessary to secure state-owned
property in Dr. Ortega's office."' She also noted that the petitioners had originally maintained that the search was a routine inventory
of property and in accordance with standard hospital procedures for
a departing, terminated, or separated employee." 2 However, the
plurality stated that Dr. Ortega had not been terminated from employment at the time of the initial search and that the record did not
disclose whether the policy applied to persons placed upon administrative leave."l 3 Justice O'Connor also noted Dr. Ortega's contention that the search was to discover evidence with which to establish
a basis for his termination. 1 14 She conceded, as Dr. Ortega contended, that no inventory had been taken of the property in his office, and the items that were seized in the search eventually were
used in the administrative proceedings. 1 15 Justice O'Connor conU.S. at 342).
108 Id. (plurality opinion). The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the court of appeals reversed, granting summary judgment as to the liability for the search and remanding for a determination of the damages sustained by Dr.
Ortega. Id. (plurality opinion).
109 Id. (plurality opinion).
1x0 Id. (plurality opinion).
I"' Id. (plurality opinion). In a deposition, the leader of the investigative team, Mr.
Friday, suggested that the search was initiated to "'make sure that we had our state
property identified, and in order to provide Dr. Ortega with his property and get what
we had out of there, in order to make sure our resident's files were protected, and that
sort of stuff.'" Id. (plurality opinion).
112 Id. (plurality opinion). This was asserted by the petitioners in their motion for
summary judgment in the district court. The district court accepted that assertion and
granted the petitioner's motion based upon Chenkin v. Bellevue Hosp. Center, New
York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 479 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), a fourth amendment case challenging an inspection policy. O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1503 (plurality
opinion).
113 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1503 (plurality opinion).
114 Id. (plurality opinion).
115 Id. at 1504 (plurality opinion). Further support for Dr. Ortega's position came
107 Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
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cluded that the summary judgment granted to the petitioners by the
district court was in error because of its reliance on a hospital policy
that was nonexistent and because of the factual matters that were in
dispute."l 6 Additionally, Justice O'Connor stated that the district
court did not provide any findings concerning the scope of the
7
search that was undertaken."
Justice O'Connor finally considered the court of appeals' granting of summary judgment for Dr. Ortega and concluded that it was
incorrect.1 1 8 She stated that although the court recognized that
there was no policy applicable to the search undertaken by the hospital, the analysis must consider whether the search was reasonable
even in the absence of such a policy. 1 9 In addition, Justice
O'Connor asserted that "[a] search to secure state property is valid
as long as petitioners had a reasonable belief that there was government property in Dr. Ortega's office which needed to be secured,
and the scope of the intrusion was itself reasonable in light of its
justification."'120 Because the facts as presented by the petitioners
could possibly meet the standard as articulated, Justice O'Connor
concluded that the court of appeals' granting of summary judgment
was inappropriate and that the case must be remanded to the dis21
trict court1
B.

CONCURRING OPINION

Justice Scalia concurred with the plurality, concluding that the
case should be reversed and remanded. However,Justice Scalia disagreed with both the rationale and the fourth amendment standard
set forth.' 22 He argued that, contrary to the plurality's contention,
fourth amendment protections of privacy are not a question of
"whether [an] office is 'so open to fellow employees or the public
that no expectation of privacy is reasonable.' "123 Justice Scalia
stated that the plurality has provided no guide as to how "open" an
office must be before it loses any privacy rights. 1 24 Moreover, Jusfrom a statement made by Dr. O'Connor that the search was "'to look for contractural
[sic] and other kinds of documents that might have been related to the issues' involved

in the investigation." Id. (plurality opinion).
116 Id. (plurality opinion).
117 Id. (plurality opinion).
118 Id. (plurality opinion).
119 Id. (plurality opinion).
120 Id. (plurality opinion).
121 Id. (plurality opinion).
122 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
123 Id. at 1505 (Scalia, J., concurring)(quoting id. at 1498 (plurality opinion)).
124 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated that the standard advanced by the
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tice Scalia rejected the plurality's direction that the issue of whether
a reasonable expectation of privacy existed should be determined
on a "case-by-case" basis. 12 5 Justice Scalia stressed the continuing
difficulties created for the police, the courts, and the citizens by a
case-by-case factual analysis to determine fourth amendment stan126
dards for protection of privacy.
Justice Scalia stated that he disagreed with the plurality, as their
standard would result in Dr. Ortega losing his reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the hospital officials had "extensive
'work-related reasons to enter [his] office.' "127 According to justice
Scalia, the issue of privacy rights in an office had been settled in
Mancusi v. DeForte,128 in which it was stated that an employee's "personal office is constitutionally protected against warrantless intrusions by the police, even though employer and co-workers are not
excluded." 129 Justice Scalia continued that whether the government
or a private entity is the employer should not effect the analysis of
whether an employee has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
workplace.' 30 He emphasized that "[c]onstitutional protection
against unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear
merely because the government has the right to make reasonable
1
intrusions in its capacity as employer."''
Justice Scalia further disagreed with the plurality's reasoning
that the nature of an expectation of privacy changed according to
whether the searcher was a law enforcement officer or a supervisor. 132 He contended that the status of the searcher speaks to
whether the search was reasonable, not to whether there was a
plurality was so devoid of content that it would lead to increased uncertainty in the field.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
125 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
126 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181
(1984)("This Court repeatedly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, police, and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of Fourth Amendment standards
to be applied in differing factual circumstances.").
127 107 S.Ct. at 1505 (Scalia, J., concurring)(quoting id. at 1498 (plurality opinion)).
Justice Scalia added that a father's fourth amendment rights are not diminished in his
home by a family's movement throughout the house, and, similarly, a tenant's rights are
not extinguished by a landlord's right of entry onto the premises. Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
128 392 U.S. 364 (1968). In this case, the Court held that an employee's office at the
union headquarters was protected by the fourth amendment, although, implicitly, the
protection excluded union "higher ups." O'Connor, 107 S.Ct. at 1505 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
129 107 S.Ct. at 1505 (Scalia, J., concurring).
130 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
131 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
132 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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fourth amendment protection of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 13 3 Justice Scalia asserted determining the reasonableness of a
given intrusion is a matter for a more "global" analysis.' 3 4 Justice
Scalia concluded that he would hold that "the offices of government
employees, and afortiori the drawers and files within those offices,
are covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter."' 3 5 He added that because Dr. Ortega's office was undisputedly
private and there were no special circumstances presented to suggest a deviation from the normal rule, he would hold that the lower
court rulings that Dr. Ortega was protected by the fourth amend36
ment were correct.'
Justice Scalia then stated that the key issue of the case was
whether the search of Dr. Ortega's office was reasonable; to answer
that question, the status of the searchers is relevant.' 3 7 While Justice Scalia acknowledged that generally a valid warrant based upon
probable cause has been required to justify an unconsented search,
he noted that "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement"' 3 8 have provided grounds for an exception to the rule.
Justice Scalia asserted that the case of government employers is one
with "special needs."' 9 He noted that government employers have
the same needs for quick access to employees' offices and desks for
work-related purposes as their private counterparts. Thus, Justice
Scalia concluded, when a search is "to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules-searches of the
sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context-do not violate the Fourth Amendment."' 14 0 As with
the plurality, Justice Scalia found the record wanting as to the purpose of the search of Dr. Ortega's office, and consequently agreed
that the lower court's ruling for summary judgment should be reId. (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia cites an example in which a firefighter
intrudes upon a household in an effort to fight a fire. Justice Scalia advocates that the
analysis must then ask whether that intrusion was reasonable as opposed to whether a
tenant has a reasonable expectation of privacy from intrusions by his landlord. Id.
(Scalia, J., concurring).
135 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia added that a qualifier was necessary to
provide for the situation in which a government employee's office is completely open to
the public and hence has no expectation of privacy. Id. at 1505-06 (Scalia, J., concurring). See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
136 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1506 (Scalia, J., concurring).
137 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
138 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring)(citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)).
139 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
140 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
133

134

SUPREME COURT REVIEW
versed and remanded.
C.

[Vol. 78

141

DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Blackmun dissented from the plurality's opinion.' 42 He
stressed that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his office, that there existed no factual dispute as to the nature of the
investigatory search, and that there were no "special needs"' 4 3 that
justified dispensing with the warrant and probable cause standard. 144 Justice Blackmun stated that the traditional standard had
clearly not been satisfied prior to the search of Dr. Ortega's work
14 5
area, and, thus, his fourth amendment rights had been violated.
According to Justice Blackmun, the plurality's problems were a
result of their "failure or unwillingness to realize that the facts here
are clear."' 14 6 Thus, Justice Blackmun applied the traditional standard of "special need" articulated in New Jersey v. T.L.O. and concluded that Dr. Ortega's fourth amendment rights were clearly
violated. He noted that because the plurality contended that there
was a factual dispute about whether the search was investigatory in
nature or routine, the plurality felt compelled to announce a new
standard of reasonableness for work-related intrusions that stood
47
alone from the case at bar.'
Justice Blackmun, in particular, disagreed with the plurality's
analysis because he believed the issues involved in O'Connorhad not
been adjudicated extensively. 148 He asserted that proper fourth
amendment analysis had always included a fact-based examination
and that it was inappropriate for the plurality to formulate a new
standard without considering the facts of the instant case.' 49 Justice
Blackmun conceded that there have been reservations expressed
concerning the use of a case-by-case type of factual analysis for determining fourth amendment standards. 150 However, he suggested
that, given the multitude of scenarios that could be imagined in the
workplace context, a case-by-case type of analysis might be justi141 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
142 Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens in dissent.
143 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1506 (Blackmun,J., dissenting)(citing NewJersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)).
144 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
147 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
149 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
150 Id. at 1506-07 n.2. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 181 (1984).
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fled.' 5 1 Justice Blackmun stated that in developing a standard for a
type of workplace intrusion, the Court must be guided by a "concrete set of facts" to arrive at a rule that embraces a specific
15 2
circumstance.
Justice Blackmun further asserted that by removing the facts
from their analysis, the plurality failed to follow the constraints of
prior authority and articulated an unprincipled, possibly biased
standard in contrast with the long held fourth amendment standard
requiring a warrant based upon probable cause for an unconsented
search. 15 3 Indeed, Justice Blackmun went so far as to say that "the
plurality has assumed the existence of hypothetical facts from which
15 4
its standard follows."'
In support of his contention that what occurred was clearly a
search of an investigatoy nature, Justice Blackmun briefly reviewed
the factual record. 15 5 He stressed that it is not clear how the search
of Dr. Ortega's office can be described as one for inventory purposes. 156 Justice Blackmun reiterated the plurality's concession that
the search could not have been undertaken pursuant to the hospital
policy of inventorying property of all terminated employees as Dr.
Ortega had not been terminated at the time the searches occurred. 15 7 In addition, he noted that there was no hospital policy to
inventory state property in the offices of employees on administrative leave.' 5 8
151 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1507 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 400 (1985)(Stevens, J., dissenting)("The only true rules governing
search and seizure have been formulated and refined in the painstaking scrutiny of caseby-case adjudication."); NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 366-67 (1985)(Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I would not think it necessary to develop a
single standard to govern all school searches, any more than traditional Fourth Amendment law applies even the probable-cause standard to all searches and seizures" (emphasis in original))).
152 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157
(1961).
153 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1507 n.3 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun suggested that when facts are abandoned in the analysis of a cse, judicial "predilections"
surface and greatly influence the formation of the resulting standard that is articulated.
He noted Justice Cardozo's warning that below every person's conscious there are
'other forces, the likes and dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of
instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be
litigant or judge.'" Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167 (1921)).
154 Id. at 1507 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 1507 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun questioned how, given the
record, the plurality could assert a factual dispute existed. Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
156 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
157 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
158 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that in addition to concluding incorrectly that the hospital had an inventory policy that applied to the search at
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Justice Blackmun also disputed the plurality's assertion that the
lack of a hospital policy to support the inventorying of an employee's office when that employee has been placed on administrative leave does not necessarily make the purpose untrue.' 5 9 He
acknowledged the evidence of a concern by the hospital over the
whereabouts of a computer and also some work files of Dr. Ortega
but stressed that these concerns were not supported by the record
160
as the real reason for the intrusion.
Justice Blackmun stated that the leader of the "investigative
team," Mr. Friday, was on the record as denying that the computer
had anything to do with the purpose of the initial search.' 6 1 Similarly, Justice Blackmun added that Dr. O'Connor stated the computer was a focus of the investigation in regards to its acquisition
but was not the primary purpose of the intrusion into Dr. Ortega's
62

office. 1

While Justice Blackmun conceded that there was deposition testimony to the effect that the intrusion of Dr. Ortega's office was undertaken in part to separate personal from state property, 163 he
emphasized that this contention was "overwhelmingly contradicted"
by other testimony and by the actual search itself.164 Justice Blackmun noted that Dr. O'Connor had repeatedly referred to the people
who searched Dr. Ortega's office as "investigators." 16 5 He also
noted that even when Dr. O'Connor was speaking of the search as
an inventory, he referred to the proceedings as an investigation. 166
Justice Blackmun stated that, as the plurality recognized, no formal
16 7
inventory was ever taken of the contents of Dr. Ortega's office.
Furthermore, he stated that the items that were seized after the extensive search were highly personal and used later in termination
hearings to impeach a witness who appeared on Dr. Ortega's behalf.
Lastly, Justice Blackmun highlighted the fact that the search was
issue, the district court also erroneously stated that Dr. Ortega had notice and opportu-

nity to witness the search. Id. at 1507 n.4. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 1507-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 1508 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
161 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
162 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
163 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
164 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
165 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun quoted Dr. O'Connor:
Basically what we were trying to do is to remove what was obviously State records or
records that had to do with his program, his department, any of the materials that
would be involved in running the residency program, around contracts, around the
computer, around the areas that we were interested in investigating.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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conducted at night 6 8 and subsequent to the obtaining of legal advice. 16 9 He concluded that the search was both exceptional in nature and undertaken for the purpose of investigating Dr. Ortega. As
a result, Justice Blackmun stated that no significant factual dispute
170
existed in the case.
Justice Blackmun next examined the plurality's analysis of a
public employee's fourth amendment rights in his workplace.' 7 ' He
stressed that he agreed with the important conclusion of the plurality that Dr. Ortega did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his desk and file cabinets.' 72 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun noted
that the plurality was correct in conceding that Dr. Ortega also had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office. 173 Justice Blackmun
recognized other areas of agreement with the plurality such as the
statement that "[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights
merely because they work for the government instead of a private
employer."' 74 He further stated his agreement with the plurality's
assertion that, in some circumstances, an employee's expectation of
privacy can be diminished through the "operational realities" of the
work environment. 175 However, Justice Blackmun stated he was in
sharp disagreement with the observation by the plurality that a public employee could forfeit all of his expectations of privacy as a result of routine office intrusions.' 76 Justice Blackmun criticized the
plurality's suggestion as being inconsistent with the expectations of
privacy that have traditionally been afforded to offices. 177 Occasional business-related visitors, Justice Blackmun asserted, are the
norm in our society and as such have been implicitly recognized in
178
prior fourth amendment decisions protecting the office.
Justice Blackmun accepted the plurality's view that the expectation of privacy for an employee is contingent on the nature of the
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
17" Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See id. at 1498.
174 Id. at 1508 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1498).
175 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting id. at 1498).
176 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
177 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 n.8
(1984)("The Fourth Amendment's protection of offices and commercial buildings, in
which there may be legitimate expectations of privacy, is also based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the Amendment"); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966)(an "office" included in a litany of areas protected by the fourth
amendment).
178 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1509 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(citing Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 n.8 (1984); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966).
168
169
170
171
172
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proposed intrusion. 17 9 He stated that traditional fourth amendment
protection is applicable in different degrees according to the context
of the privacy asserted.18 0 However, Justice Blackmun quoted with
approval Justice Scalia's assertion that "[c]onstitutional protection
against unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear
merely because the government has the right to make reasonable
intrusions in its capacity as employer." 1 8 1 Justice Blackmun concluded that whereas an employee might not have an expectation of
privacy against a co-worker visiting his office occasionally, he would
be protected against an after-hours search of his locked private office by an "investigative team seeking materials to be used against
him at a termination proceeding." 182 Justice Blackmun asserted
that the plurality has not sufficiently acknowledged the reality of the
workplace in modern society.' 8 3 Emphasizing the long hours at
work experienced by many, Justice Blackmun noted that such a routine has created a necessity of overlap between home and work
life.' 84 He elaborated that personal calls, visitors, and business reg179 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
180 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun cited New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469

U.S. 325, 339 (1985); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 329 (1979) (opening a
retail store to the public does not mean the store has given up an expectation of privacy
against unconsented searches and seizures). Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1498 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis
in original)).
182 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also quoted a recently reported
statement by Attorney General Edwin Meese embodying the general idea that a person
has an expectation of privacy in materials left in his office. Responding to a question
concerning a search of government employee's offices and seizure of material related to
an alleged illegal diversion of government funds to a Central American group, the Attorney General stated: "'I'm not sure we would have any opportunity or any legal right
to get those personal papers. There was certainly no evidence of criminality that would
have supported a search warrant at the time. I don't think public employees' private
documents belong to the Government.'" Id. at 1509 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1986, at 11, col. 3.). Justice Blackmun further cited
cases to support his contention that an employee's workplace is protected by the fourth
amendment. See, e.g., Gillard v. Smith, 579 F.2d 825, 829 (3rd Cir. 1978)(search of a
desk); United States v. McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 1978)(conversations at
desk); but see, Williams v. Collins, 728 F.2d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 1984)("It is by no means
certain that Williams had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his government-furnished desk, in relation to the possibility of his supervisors entering the desk as part of
an investigation of William's job performance or as part of an office inventory."). Lastly,
Justice Blackmun noted the cases that have held that there is no expectation of privacy
based upon the existence of a regulation permitting searches. See United States v.
Spreights, 557 F.2d 362, 364-65 (3rd Cir. 1977)(summarized line of decisions); United
States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aft'd, 379 F. 2d 288 (3rd Cir.
1967)(upheld warrantless search of employee locker at U.S. Mint pursuant to regulations). Justice Blackmun stated that the issue of a regulation was not before the Court.
O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1509 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
183 107 S. Ct. at 1509 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
184 Id. at 1509-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun cited R. KANTER,
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ularly takes place at the typical office.18 5 Thus, Justice Blackmun
chastised the plurality's opinion as one that "reveals . . .a certain
insensitivity to the 'operational realities of the workplace.... "186
The dissent concluded that Dr. Ortega "clearly had an expectation of privacy in his office, desk, and file cabinets, particularly with
respect to the type of investigatory search involved here."18 7 Moreover, he admonished courts which might face a similar issue to determine the reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the
intrusion at hand.' 8 8
Justice Blackmun then reviewed the plurality's analysis as to
what constituted a fourth amendment standard of reasonableness.' 8 9 He criticized the plurality's conclusion that a balancing of
the "privacy interests of the employee against the public employer's
WORK AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES:

A

CRITICAL REVIEW AND AGENDA FOR RE-

SEARCH AND POIiCY 31-32 (1977) and R. BELLAH, ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITrMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 288-89 (1985).

In HABITS OF THE HEART,

the authors stressed the pressure placed upon the family unit by the long hours spent at
work striving for success. O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1509-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
185 107 S. Ct. at 1510 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun remarked on the
blurring of the line between home and work caused by the entrance of women into the
workforce in modem times. Id. at 1510 n.6 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). See BNA SPECIAL
REPORT, WORK & FAMILY: A CHANGING DYNAMIC 1, 3, 13-15 (1986).
The myth of "separate worlds"-one of work and the other of family life-long
harbored by employers, unions, and even workers themselves has been effectively
laid to rest. Their inseparability is undeniable, particularly as two-earner families
have become the norm where they once were the exception and as a distressing
number of single parents are required to raise children on their own. The import of
work-family conflicts-for the family, for the workplace, and, indeed, for the whole
of society-will grow as these demographic and social transformations in the roles
of men and women come to be more fully clarified and appreciated.
BNA SPECIAL REPORT, WORK & FAMILY: A CHANGING DYNAMIC 13-15 (1986).
186 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1510 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1498). Justice
Blackmun argued also that the plurality's implicit contention that the ownership of much
of the elements of the workplace would lessen the employees' expectation of privacy is
in error. He derives the implication from the plurality's description of what constitutes
the workplace context ("the hallways, cafeteria, offices, desks, and file cabinets"), as opposed to the employee's "closed personal luggage, a handbag or a briefcase." Id. at
1510 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1497). Justice Blackmun emphasized
that earlier decisions of the Court have settled that expectations of privacy under the
fourth amendment are not dependent upon ownership of the area. Id.; see e.g., Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)(the protection of the fourth amendment is contingent
upon the individual having a reasonable expectation of privacy, not upon owning the
property that is invaded); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)(fourth amendment protects people, not simply "areas"). Although Justice Blackmun conceded that
the fact of ownership is relevant to the appropriate level of an employee's reasonable
expectation of privacy, it does not act to deny fourth amendment protections to an individual. O'Connor, 107 S.Ct. at 1510 n.7 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
187 107 S.Ct. at 1510 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
188 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
189 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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interests justifying the intrusion" was the appropriate analysis.19 0
Justice Blackmun stated that the traditional standard of reasonableness as laid out in the fourth amendment requires a warrant based
upon probable cause.' 9 ' He stressed that only in the exceptional
circumstance in which there were "special needs" rendering the
traditional requirements as "impracticable" had the warrant and
probable cause standard given way to a "balancing of interests"
analysis. 192 Justice Blackmun explained that the practical test of
when the traditional fourth amendment standard can be foregone in
favor of a balancing of interests analysis results when the obtaining
of a warrant based upon probable cause would completely frustrate
19 3
the efforts of the investigating party.
Justice Blackmun stated that he had similarly criticized the
Court in New Jersey v. TL.O. 194 for omitting the crucial "special
needs" inquiry. 19 5 However, Justice Blackmun asserted that in New
Jersey v. TL.O., the Court was justified in utilizing a "balancing"
analysis because a "special need" was present in the school context. 19 6 He reiterated his reasoning from T.L.O. that a teacher in a
secondary school must be able to maintain discipline in order to effectively conduct classes and that effectiveness will not be achieved
if a warrant based upon probable cause is required for every situation in which a search is appropriate. 19 7 Justice Blackmun noted the
"special need" of educators to act without delay when there is a
threat of violence or disruption of the educational process as justifying the adoption of a lesser standard than a warrant requirement or
19 8
a finding of probable cause.
Justice Blackmun then remarked that the plurality had repeated
the error of the Court in T.L. 0. 199 Although the plurality noted the
190 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 1511 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
192 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351
(1985)(Blackmun,J., concurring injudgment)). See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
721-22 and n. 1 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
193 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1511 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
194 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
195 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1511 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
196 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
197 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1511 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
198 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). See NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (in which Justice Blackmun stated: "The special need
for an immediate response to behavior that threatens either the safety of schoolchildren
and teachers or the educational process itself justifies the Court in excepting school
searches from the warrant and probable-cause requirements, and in applying a standard
determined by balancing the relevant interests.").
199 107 S. Ct. at 1514 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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"special need" inquiry, Justice Blackmun argued that there was insufficient analysis devoted to determining whether there was any
"special need" present before the plurality went on to a balancing
test. 200 In O'Connor, however, Justice Blackmun stressed that the
omission was critical, as there was no "special need" discernible
from the facts presented that would make the acquisition of a warrant based on probable cause "impracticable. ' 20 ' Justice Blackmun
reiterated that the facts suggested that while Dr. Ortega was on administrative leave and not permitted to enter the hospital grounds, a
search of his office was commenced that was investigatory in nature
with the primary purpose of obtaining evidence of Dr. Ortega's
management improprieties. 20 2 Justice Blackmun reasoned that obtaining a search warrant from a magistrate would not have acted to
frustrate the hospital management goals of "an effective institution
devoted to training and healing, to which the disciplining of
' 20 3
[h]ospital employees contributed.
Moreover, Justice Blackmun stated that the search of Dr.
Ortega's office was a situation in which enlisting the aid of an impartial magistrate would have been a particularly appropriate check of
the intrusions into Dr. Ortega's privacy.20 4 He added that having to
articulate both the justification and the explicit items the searchers
hoped to find would have acted to prevent the indiscriminant "rum20 5
maging through the doctor's office, desk and file cabinets."
Therefore, Justice Blackmun concluded that because no "special
need" existed justifying dispensing with the traditional fourth
amendment standard of a warrant based on probable cause, and because the petitioners would have failed to meet this standard, the
holding of the court of appeals that the petitioners violated Dr.
20 6
Ortega's fourth amendment rights should be affirmed.
Justice Blackmun next addressed the balancing analysis of the
plurality in regards to the warrant requirement, stating that even if
he accepted the plurality's contention that there was a "special
need" to dispense with the traditional warrant and probable cause
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
202 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
203 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
204 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See United States v. United States District Court,
407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972)("The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy .....
205 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1511 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
206 Id. at 1511-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
200
201
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standard, the plurality's balancing was "seriously flawed." 20 7 Again
he asserted that the plurality had erred by removing the facts from
their analysis and arriving at conclusions based upon "assumed"
208
facts.
Justice Blackmun criticized the plurality for "sweeping with a
broad brush" with their announced conclusion that because a warrant requirement would "seriously disrupt the routine conduct of
business and would be unduly burdensome," 20 9 it would not be required for public employer searches of employee offices, desks, or
file cabinets. 2 10 Justice Blackmun noted that the reasoning advanced by the plurality for their conclusion was based on maintaining the efficient operation of government agencies. 2 1 1 Further, he
noted that the plurality claimed the warrant requirement would be
too "unwieldy" to employers unfamiliar with it.212
Justice Blackmun emphasized that the Court in the past had not
deviated from the traditional fourth amendment standard except in
situations in which there was no other alternative.2 1 3 Although the
Court on occasion has found it necessary to adopt a new standard,
he added, "[t]he warrant and probable-cause requirements ... con-

tinue to serve as a model in the formulation of the new standard."2 1 4 In support of this proposition, Justice Blackmun cited
Terry v. Ohio,2 1 5 a case that considered whether a brief on-the-spot

stop of persons by police officers justified adopting a lesser standard
than the warrant based on probable cause. He stressed that the
Court in Terry attempted to arrive at a standard that maintained in
principle the "neutral scrutiny of a judge" that a warrant require16
ment provides. 2
Justice Blackmun emphasized that the plurality's conclusion
that a warrant would not be required in a search by an employer
Id. at 1512 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
208 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
209 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1500).
210 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
211 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
212 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
213 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun described the requirement as "a
nexus between this other standard, the employee's privacy interests, and the government purposes to be served by the search." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
214 Id. at 1512 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
215 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
216 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1512 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
at 21, 27. Justice Blackmun also cited Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967),
as a case in which the balancing analysis that was utilized resulted in the warrant standard being retained as a requirement for health inspectors. O'Connor, 107 S.Ct. at
1512.(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
207
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could only be arrived at when the analysis was removed, as it was,
from a concrete factual situation.2 1 7 He acknowledged that a warrant should not be required for every "routine entry into an employee's workplace;" 2 18 however, the dissent admonished the view
that this fact justified dispensing with a warrant for every work-related search.2 1 9 Justice Blackmun stated that the warrant requirement would be appropriate for many employer searches, including
220
the one of Dr. Ortega's office.
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun stressed that the plurality has
not articulated how the new standard will maintain the "neutral
scrutiny of ajudge."'22 Instead, noted Justice Blackmun, the plurality completely neglected to relate the announced "reasonableness
under all the circumstances" standard with any of the principles behind the warrant standard. 22 2 Justice Blackmun concluded that "the
plurality's general result [was] preordained because, cut off from a
particular factual setting, it cannot make the necessary distinctions
among types of searches, or formulate an alternative to the warrant
requirement that derives from a precise weighing of competing
2 23
interests."
Next, Justice Blackmun noted that the plurality's analysis of an
alternative to the probable cause standard began with a contradiction.22 4 Although the plurality stated that the new standard announced was "only" applicable to a "noninvestigatory work-related
intrusion" and an "investigatory search for evidence of suspected
work-related employee misfeasance," Justice Blackmun suggested
that it would be difficult to imagine a search that would not fall
within one of these broad general catagories. 2 25 Moreover, argued
Justice Blackmun, given that the standard announced by the plurality to be utilized on remand was for both the "inventory" and "in107 S. Ct. at 1512 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1512-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see e.g., Security & Law Enforcement Employees v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1984)(government strip searches of
correctional workers held to be allowable without a warrant in certain situations because
of the important government interest in maintaining security in prisons).
219 107 S.Ct. at 1512-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
220 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that the plurality did not
elaborate on their assertion that obtaining a warrant would be "unduly burdensome."
He stated that the facts suggest the reverse would have been true. He also took exception to the inference by the plurality that a warrant is not appropriate outside of the
criminal arena, citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
O'Connor, 107 S.Ct. at 1513 n.10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
221 107 S.Ct. at 1513 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
222 Id. at 1513 n.11 (BIackmun,J., dissenting).
223 Id. at 1513 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
224 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
225 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
217
218
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vestigatory" searches described by the plurality, the plurality has
announced a standard that will apply to all public employer work22 6
related searches.
Justice Blackmun also criticized the plurality for their use of a
balancing of interests analysis to dispense with the probable cause
standard. 22 7 He asserted that, as with the analysis required to justify
a lesser standard than a warrant requirement, probable cause requires the same critical search for alternatives. 2 28 Justice Blackmun
emphasized that the plurality did not attempt to satisfy that require22 9
Justice
ment for either an inventory or an investigatory search.
Blackmun conceded that public employers have a valid interest in
2 30
eliminating work-related misfeasance and maintaining efficiency.
He further conceded that public employees may have limited expectations of privacy at work. However, Justice Blackmun stressed that,
even if these facts are true, the plurality has not explained why the
standard they arrived at "necessarily leads to the standard borrowed
from New Jersey v. T.L.O., as opposed to other imaginable standards." 23 1 Lastly, Justice Blackmun continued, the plurality did not
explain why probable cause, which has been "characterized by this
Court as a 'practical, nontechnical conception,' "232 would not provide adequate protection for public employers in a case like
233
O'Connor.
226 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
227 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
228 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
881 (1975). Justice Blackmun chastised the plurality for simply giving conclusory assertions instead of explaining the balancing that was alleged to have occurred. He cited in
support of his critical assessment the statements of the plurality that the probable cause
requirement would "'impose intolerable burdens on public employers' "; that government employers would suffer "'tangible and often irreparable damage' "; and finally
that employers cannot be expected " 'to learn the subtleties of the probable cause standard.' " O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1514 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun
emphasized that "[s]uch assertions cannot pass for careful balancing on the facts of this
case, given that the search was conducted during Dr. Ortega's administrative leave...
with the advice of counsel, and by an investigating party that included a security officer."
Id. at 1514 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
229 107 S. Ct. at 1513 n.12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
230 Id. at 1513 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
231 Id. at 1513-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original).
232 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176
(1949)).
233 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 363-64
(1985)(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun further
asserted that the plurality did little to tailor the standard of reasonableness that was
derived from T.L.O., which involved a very different factual situation, and that even if he
accepted the plurality's announced standard, he would conclude that the petitioners
have failed to meet it. He stated that, assuming that the petitioners had an individualized suspicion of mismanagement by Dr. Ortega, the scope of the search in which only
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In conclusion, Justice Blackmun recognized that new areas of
fourth amendment analysis have surfaced that require careful analy23 4
He admonished the Court to examine closely the practical
SiS.
realities of the situation presented along with the interests involved
before abandoning the traditonal safeguards of the fourth amendment for a new standard derived from a balancing test. 23 5 Justice
Blackmun asserted that "[b]y ignoring the specific facts of this case,
and by announcing in the abstract a standard as to the reasonableness of an employer's workplace searches, the plurality undermines
not only the Fourth Amendment rights of public employees but also
any further analysis of the constitutionality of public employer
2 36
searches."
IV.

DISCUSSIONAND ANALYsIS

The plurality decision in O'Connor v. Ortega represented an effort by members of the Supreme Court to carve out a broad exception, for the benefit of government employers, to the traditional
fourth amendment protections of searches provided by a warrant
requirement and a probable cause standard. However, the plurality
failed to adequately distinguish the individual privacy interests infringed upon in an investigatory search for evidence of employee
misfeasance and in a routine work-related intrusion. As a result, the
plurality arrived at a ill-defined "reasonableness under all of the circumstances" standard for virtually all employer workplace privacy
intrusions. The "reasonableness" standard announced by the plurality would appear to provide adequate protection for government
employees from the minimally intrusive routine work-related office
entries by their government employers. Nevertheless, the standard
does not provide adequate protection of public employees' legitiDr. Ortega's personal items were obtained bore no reasonable relationship to the interests articulated to justify the intrusion at the outset. Although Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the plurality had not considered the seizures an issue, he stated that
they should be relevant in determining the reasonableness of the scope of the search.
O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1513 n.14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
234 107 S. Ct. at 1513 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted the recent
cases of Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1141-43 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 577 (1986), in which the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement and probable cause standard was arrived at in part because of the heavily regulated
horse-racing industry, and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F.
Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986), in which the urinalysis testing of United States Customs
Service employees without probable cause or reasonable suspicion was held to be a violation of the employees' fourth amendment rights. O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1514 n.15
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
235 107 S. Ct. at 1514 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
236 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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mate privacy interests in the context of a government employer's
highly intrusive search of an employee's office for evidence of workrelated misfeasance. The employee's resulting lack of any semblance of traditional fourth amendment protection in the face of
such a search reflects the plurality's unprecedented and seriously
flawed opinion.
A majority of the Court correctly held that Dr. Ortega enjoyed a
reasonable expectation of privacy and was protected against unreasonable searches in his office, desk, and file cabinets by the fourth
amendment. 2 37 The basic purpose of the fourth amendment is to
protect the privacy interests of individuals against arbitrary intrusions by the government. 2 38 Whether an individual's privacy interest is protected by the fourth amendment depends on whether the
interest is one "that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate.' 23 9 An individual's office has long been recognized as an area
that receives fourth amendment protection. In Hoffa v. United
States, 240 the Court stressed that "[w]hat the Fourth Amendment
protects is the security a man relies upon when he places . . . his
property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or
his office ...
"241 The Supreme Court has further stated that an
individual's expectation of privacy in an office is "based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the [fourth]
' '24 2
[a]mendment.
Although the long-held standards of reasonableness under the
fourth amendment require a warrant and a finding of probable
cause, 2 43 Justice O'Connor asserted that a "balanc[ing] [of] the na237 Id. at 1504 (Scalia, J., concurring) and id. at 1506 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The
fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
238 T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985). Because the harm to an individual can occur
regardless of whether the government action is to investigate a criminal violation or
some other statutory or regulatory standard, the Court has held that fourth amendment
protections are not limited to investigations of criminal offenses by criminal authorities.
See id. (public school officials held to fourth amendment standards); Marshall v. Barlow's
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978)(Occupational Safety and Health inspectors held to
fourth amendment standards); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978)(firemen held
to fourth amendment standards); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528
(1967)(building inspectors held to fourth amendment standards).
239 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)).
240 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
241 Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 301.
242 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1498 (plurality opinion)(quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. 170, 178
n.8 (1980)).
243 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972)(govern-
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ture and quality of the intrusion... against the importance of the
governmental interests alleged" 244 was required to determine the
appropriate standard with which to analyze a public employer
search. The Court has utilized a balancing of interests analysis in
the past to arrive at lesser standards if there has been either an extraordinary government interest 24 5 or a very limited intrusion of an
individual's legitimate privacy interests. 246
Justice O'Connor recognized that the government employers'
need for "supervision, control and the efficient operation of the
workplace" were compelling government interests present in
O'Connor.2 47 Although it can be argued that the efficiency of government agencies is a vital national concern justifying such an analysis,
Justice O'Connor's balancing of interests that resulted in the bypassing of the traditional warrant and probable cause standards for a
standard of "reasonableness under all the circumstances" was
flawed in several respects.
Although Justice O'Connor noted that in fourth amendment
analysis "[w]hat is reasonable depends on the context within which
a search takes place," 24 8 she shaped a standard that was only justifiable in a very non-intrusive context. In an effort to formulate a standard that was applicable to both routine work-related government
employer entries of employee's work areas and to government employer investigative searches for evidence of employee misfeasance,
Justice O'Connor neglected to consider adequately the "nature and
quality" of the latter intrusion. Indeed, when a public employee's
livelihood and reputation are at stake as a result of the stigma connected with a termination based on misfeasance, employer investigations are highly analogous to criminal proceedings-. Viewed in
that light, the "nature and quality" of an investigative search of a
government employee's work area is a severe intrusion of reasonable expectations of privacy that does not justify dispensing easily
with the traditional warrant requirement.
ment electronic listening devices held subject to fourth amendment requirements of a
warrant and probable cause).
244 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1499 (plurality opinion).
245 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976)(routine automobile
stops without a warrant or probable cause along the U.S. border seen as only practical
method to control drug smuggling and entry of illegal aliens); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
24 (1968)(police officer's need to determine whether suspect is armed and dangerous
justified a brief stop-and-frisk without a warrant or probable cause).
246 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967)(housing code inspections
not required to be supported by the traditional level of probable cause to obtain a
search warrant).
247 107 S.Ct. at 1499 (plurality opinion).
248 Id. at 1499 (plurality opinion)(quoting NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337).
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Justice O'Connor described the contexts as intrusions related
to the retrieval of "correspondence, or a file or report," and, alternatively, as intrusions related to an "investigation into suspected
employee misfeasance;" however, in consideration of the applicability of the warrant requirement, she failed to treat the contexts indi24 9
vidually, instead referring to both as "work-related purpose[s]."
In keeping with that categorization, Justice O'Connor concluded
that the warrant standard of the fourth amendment would "seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unduly
burdensome.- 2 50 Although it can be conceded that requiring a warrant of a public employer who needs to retrieve a file or correspondence from the office of an absent employee would be "unduly
burdensome," Justice O'Connor provided no reasoning as to how a
warrant requirement would unduly burden an employer who is investigating an employee for suspected work-related misfeasance.
Justice O'Connor's reliance on the Court's reasoning in New
Jersey v. T.L.0.251 as to the inapplicability of the warrant requirement
for government employer investigative searches was unfounded. In
T.L.O., the Court similarly held that a warrant requirement would
"unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools." 25 2 A government
employer, however, cannot reasonably be seen to have disciplinary
needs analogous to a school official who is dealing with school children. Government employers and employees are in a business relationship between adults, and formal proceedings are the rule rather
than the exception. 25 3 That is contrary to the context of the school
environment in which adult instructors supervise children of varying
ages and maturity levels and frequently function in a quasi-parental
role that by nature lacks formality. Unlike a school context, there
are no persuasive government needs to conduct an investigative
search of an employee's work area in an informal manner. Furthermore, given that an important government need arises to undertake
the drastic action of an investigatory search of an employee in a
"swift" fashion, the government employer would bejustified to conduct the search under the "well defined exception" to the warrant
25 4
requirement of an "exigent need."
249 Id. at 1500 (plurality opinion).
250 Id. (plurality opinion)
251 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
252 T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
253 See, e.g., Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)(public

employers held to fifth amendment due process standards in employee terminations).
254 See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, in her balancing analysis related to the warrant requirement, Justice O'Connor erred in her assertion that public employees' legitimate privacy interests are limited solely to the "private
objects" they bring to work.2 5 5 As Justice Blackmun emphasized,
"privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment do not turn
on ownership ..
-256 Rather, the fourth amendment protects individuals' legitimate expectations of privacy in areas such as an office,
25 7
not simply their interest in private objects that are placed there.
Justice O'Connor's conclusion that a probable cause standard
will "impose intolerable burdens" and will result in "tangible and
often irreparable damage" to a government employer was similarly
flawed by the deficiency of weight given to the individual's legitimate privacy expectations against highly intrusive investigatory
searches. Justice O'Connor asserted that violations of employee
privacy interests, like those of individuals subject to housing inspections in Camarav. Municipal Court,25 8 "involve[d] a relatively limited
invasion" of individual privacy. 25 9 However, the reasoning that investigatory searches by government employers can be analogized to
the administrative searches at issue in Camarais baseless. The Court
in Camara premised its assertion on the fact that the searches were
"neither personal in nature nor aimed at discovery of evidence of a
crime ... .-"260 On the contrary, government employer investigatory
searches that intrude into an area in which employees admittedly
have a reasonable expectation of privacy to discover evidence of employee misfeasance can only be seen as a personal intrusion. As occurred in O'Connor, the unconsented search of an employee's desk
can also expose highly personal items such as correspondence or a
journal. Furthermore, as noted in connection with the warrant requirement analysis above, investigative searches by government employers to locate evidence of employee misfeasance are highly
analogous to criminal proceedings in both form and substance.
The broad right of government employers to make investigative
searches of their employees' work areas is seen by the plurality as
O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1500 (plurality opinion).
O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1510 n.7 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
257 See e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 n.8 (1984)("The Fourth Amendment's protection of offices and commercial buildings, in which there may be legitimate
expectations of privacy, is also based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in
the history of the Amendment."); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359
(1967)("Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.").
258 387 U.S. 523.
259 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1502 (plurality opinion)(citing Camara, 387 U.S. at 537).
260 Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
255

256
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necessary to further the employers' efforts to monitor employee
work performance or to investigate suspected employee misfeasance. However, traditional methods utilized to achieve those
objectives are highly effective and suggest the limited nature of additional relevant information or evidence that could be found in an
investigatory search. To arrive at a well-reasoned, supportable justification for the government to intrude on an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy, alternative methods of achieving the government's objectives must be considered. Several of the less intrusive
and highly effective alternatives not addressed by the plurality in arriving at their lesser standard of "reasonableness" are worthy of
consideration.
Traditional strategies for investigating employee performance
that are Of limited intrusiveness yet can provide significant relevant
information include: observing the employee in the workplace performing assigned tasks; monitoring and evaluating the employee's
work-product while in process and at completion; questioning the
suspected employee's co-workers; and interviewing the employee.
Through the use of such methodology the government employer is
likely to obtain sufficient relevant evidence of the validity of their
suspicions. The only additional resulting value of an investigatory
search to an employer will most certainly be, as was the case in
O'Connor, to gain "access to private materials that would not other26 1
wise be available to the government."
In addition, the items of the highest probative value to the government employer are going to be primarily "employment-related
papers and documents." 26 2 As these materials must be turned over
to the government employer on demand, 263 the employer has broad
access to evidence of suspected employee misfeasance. Should the
employee refuse to relinquish any of the requested materials, the
issue of an investigative search would be moot, as the employee
2 64
could then be justifiably terminated.
Finally, lower courts have upheld government employer's policies that limit employees' reasonable expectations of privacy. In
United States v. Bunkers, 26 5 a warrantless search of a postal worker's
261 Brief Amicus Curiae (Joel I. Klein) for Respondent at 35, O'Connorv. Ortega, 107 S.
Ct. 1492 (1987)(No. 85-530)(emphasis in original).
262 Id.
263 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (191 1)(public employee's work held
not to be privileged information against public employer's investigation).
264 Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 (1968)(police officers refusal to comply
with inquiries specifically related to performance of official duties and not related to
criminal prosecution was held to be valid grounds for discharge).
265 521 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 989 (1975).
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locker to look for stolen mail was upheld because of the existance of
a regulation outlining the government's right to search employee
lockers. 26 6 Similarly, in United States v. Donato,2 67 a warrantless
search was upheld pursuant to a government regulation that established that United States Mint employees were not to consider their
lockers private. 2 68 Thus, if a government employer, such as the hospital officials in O'Connor, decided that there was a need to have
broad access to employee work areas, that could be effectively accomplished through employee regulations. However, when the
need to conduct an investigative search is an isolated incident in an
unregulated government work environment, the government employee would appear to be deserving of the traditional fourth
amendment protections.
The legitimate needs of a government employer to maintain
employee performance and efficiency can be accomplished almost
entirely through a combination of the aforementioned alternatives
without any need for investigative searches. Thus, for the extremely
limited situations in which a government employer has a legitimate
need to search an employee's office or desk, the warrant standard
would be necessary to fulfill its purpose of checking unrestrained
executive discretion with the objective standards of a magistrate.2 6 9
As stated in United States v. United States District Court,27 0 "[t]he warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not dead language.... It is
not an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed' against claims of...

efficiency."271
The "long-prevailing standards" of probable cause 27 2 also
should not be discarded lightly for the highly intrusive government
employer investigative search context. Probable cause not only has
direct support in the text of the fourth amendment; it has been represented by the Court as "the accumulated wisdom of precedent
and experience as to the minimum justification necessary to make
the kind of intrusion involved in an arrest 'reasonable.' "273 Because of the analogous nature of investigatory searches for evidence
266
267
268
269

Id. at 1219, 1220.
269 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. Pa.), aft'd, 379 F.2d 288 (3rd Cir. 1967).
Id. at 923-24.
See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1971)(citing

N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNrTED
STATES CONsTITunON, 79-105 (1937)).
270 407 U.S. 297 (1971).
271 Id. at 315 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971)).
272 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979)(quoting Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
273 Id. (custodial detention by police of a criminal suspect without probable cause held
to be a violation of the fourth amendment).
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of employee misfeasance to criminal proceedings, probable cause
will provide the same important threshold test in the government
employer investigatory search context. Probable cause, in contrast
to the plurality's loosely defined "reasonableness" standard, has
been described by the Court as a "practical," "non-technical," and
"easily applied" "common sense test" 2 74 and should therefore be
adhered to.
The guidelines suggested by Justice O'Connor for practical usage of the announced "reasonableness" standard provide little clarity as to the standard's limitations on investigatory searches by
government employers. Justice O'Connor noted that a search "will
be 'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence" of employee misfeasance and "will be permissible in scope when the 'measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and
not excessively intrusive in light of ... the nature of the [misconduct].' "275 However, the attempt to clarify the practical meaning of
a "reasonableness" standard through references to "reasonable
grounds" and "measures reasonably related to the objectives" is redundant and adds no substance to the vacuous standard announced.
In addition, as noted by Justice Blackmun, the plurality gave no
rationale as to how the announced standard captures any of the
traditional protections of the warrant requirement. 2 76 As Justice
Blackmun reasoned, the new standard appears to be simply an alternative standard to probable cause. 27 7 Unlike the warrant and probable cause standards, however, the "reasonableness" standard has
no well-defined body of precedent or clear guidelines to support its
application.
The conclusion ofJustice O'Connor that the warrant and probable cause standards can be bypassed for the context of government
employer investigatory searches in favor of a "reasonableness under
all the circumstances" standard is overbroad in its reach and unclear
as to its substance. The plurality has created an unwise exception to
traditional fourth amendment protections.
V.

CONCLUSION

In O'Connor v. Ortega, a plurality of the United States Supreme
Court announced that in the context of government employer intru274
275
276
277

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235-36, 238-39 (1983).
O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1503 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 1513 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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sions of employee's expectations of privacy, for work-related
noninvestigatory searches as well as work-related investigations of
employee misfeasance, a "reasonableness of all the circumstances"
standard is appropriate for an analysis of whether the employee's
fourth amendment rights had been violated.
The plurality persuasively reasoned that the efficiency interests
of the government employers as well as the limited expectations of
privacy of the employees supported a "reasonableness" standard
for work-related noninvestigatory intrusions. However, in the context of government employer investigatory searches, the plurality
created an unprecedented and unnecessarily broad exception to the
traditional fourth amendment requirements of a warrant issued on
the basis of a finding of probable cause. The announced standard of
"reasonableness under all the circumstances" for such a highly intrusive context will generate confusion as to its limits and, furthermore, will fail to adequately protect individual privacy 2for
78
government employees as provided for in the fourth amendment.
E. MILEs KILBURN
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O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1499-1503 (plurality opinion).

